We analyze the impact of a 75 pct. Break 
Introduction.
The EU initiative on the regulation of takeover bids was initiated by the 1985 White Paper on the completion of the Internal Market, which identified the need for a new company directive. A significant chapter in this ongoing process is the publication in January 2002 of the "Report on the
High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues related to Takeover
Bids" authored by a group of European law professors chaired by Jaap Winter. We will refer to this as the Winter-report throughout this paper. The Winter-report proposed a number of changes to the existing company laws around Europe, some of which have stirred an intense debate among economists and law researchers.
In this paper we focus on the impact on European firms of only one of these proposals, namely the introduction of a Break-Through rule, henceforth denoted BT-rule. The BT-rule states that an investor, after acquiring a certain threshold of the cash flow rights to a firm, should be able to break through the firm's current control structure. The report suggests that the threshold should be set at 75 percent, so that any owner possessing 75 percent of the total outstanding shares, independently on the presence of dual class shares, should have complete control with the firm including the ability to replace the management and/or the board of directors instantly.
Obviously, a BT-rule affects only the control structures of firms having multiple share classes with different number of votes attached. Thus, many observers have seen this proposal as an attack on the control structure of firms with dual class shares, a type of ownership that is fairly common in many European countries (Faccio and Lang 2002) . If controlling owners hold a large fraction of the superior voting shares (SVSs) and a small fraction of limited voting shares (LVSs), it is possible that the introduction of a BT-rule affects the control structure in the firm. An aggressive investor outside -or even belonging to -the group of controlling owners may buy enough of the votes with limited voting rights to invoke the BT-rule and takeover the firm.
However, it is worth emphasizing, that the impact of a BT-rule on firms with dual class shares will vary depending on how the ownership of such firms is organized; in particular, it depends on how many outstanding shares that exist of each type, the number of votes attached to each class, the distribution of shares among the group of owners and the threshold level assigned in the BT-rule.
Hence, if controlling owners in addition to their SVSs possess a large fraction of the LVSs, the impact of a BT-rule will be limited.
The main objective of the present analysis is to identify which firms within the European Union are likely to be affected by a BT-rule. We do this by analyzing the distribution of cash flow and control rights for 1,035 European firms across 10 countries with dual class shares.
1 Using Sweden as an example, we develop a method to categorize all 1,035 firms into four groups, depending on the control structure before and after the introduction of the BT-rule. We show that approximately 3-5 pct. of the firms, mainly in Denmark, Germany, Italy and Sweden, face a direct loss of control after the introduction of a BT-rule. In these firms there is a single owner or a group of controlling owners possessing at least 50 pct. of the votes but less than 25 pct. of the total outstanding shares.
In addition, many firms incur a potential control loss, which we define as a situation where none single owner, nor the group of largest owners possess 50 pct. or more of the votes in the firm and less than 25 pct. of the total outstanding shares. We estimate that between 45 and 62 pct. of the analyzed firms will face a potential control loss after the introduction of a BT-rule. Among the largest firms in Europe with dual class shares around two thirds of the companies faces a potential control loss.
Since this group is large, it is indeed important to distinguish between firms that are located in this group due to a general dispersed ownership structure and firms in which control is concentrated and cash flow is dispersed. We find that the former is the case for the British and Irish firms in our sample, whereas the latter is dominant for firms in Continental Europe and Scandinavia, indicating that the potential control loss for firms in these countries are likely to be more serious than for similar firms in UK and Ireland.
We formalize this argument by defining that only firms with a certain degree of disproportionality between votes and cash flow are likely to realize the potential control loss. We find that in addition to the group of firms facing a direct control loss, between 11-17 pct. (or between 119 and 179) of the whole sample of firms are likely to incur a control loss. Most of these firms are incorporated in Germany, Italy, Scandinavia and -surprisingly -in United Kingdom.
One likely response to the introduction of a BT-rule is that firms will -if possible -change their ownership structure to avoid any control loss of a BT-rule (as suggested for example by Bebchuck and Hart 2002 , Bolton 2002 and Mayer 2002 . This can have several implications for the ability to raise capital by issuing new shares in the open market. Some controlling owners may need to buy up more shares to avoid the consequences of the BT-rule. Other firms may be limited in the amount of new shares they can issue to outsiders without the controlling owner(s) falling short of the threshold value of 25 pct. of the outstanding shares. Hence, it is important to know the impact on the ability to raise new capital through share offers. Using Sweden as an example again, we develop a categorization of the BT-rule's impact on potential share issues and apply this to the 1,035 EU firms in our sample. We find that a significant number of firms may be affected this way through the introduction of the BT-rule.
In a recent paper Berglöf and Burkart (2002) provide a strong theoretical based analysis of the economic impact of the Winter-report with a focus on the BT-rule and the proposed mandatory bid rule. Berglöf and Burkart recognize the need for improvements in the corporate standards in Europe; however, they and other commentators (e.g. Bolton 2002 , Mayer 2002 and Pagano 2002 criticize the whole idea of redesigning corporate governance standards in Europe through making changes in the regulation of the takeover process. Other observers (notably Jensen 2002) have supported the Winter-report arguing that creating a "level playing field" among European firms is the appropriate way to increase the standard of corporate governance in Europe.
In the present paper we do not add significantly to the debate about the welfare implications of the BT-rule. The main purpose of our analysis is twofold: first, to develop a categorization system useful to identify firms affected by corporate policy initiatives directed at firms with dual class shares and disproportionality between control and residual income rights, such as a BT-rule at any level; second, to use this system to specifically identify firms affected by a 75 pct. BT-rule as suggested in the Winter-report. Most of the debate regarding the introduction of a BT-rule refers to a few prominent cases, such as the Wallenberg controlled Investor AB in Sweden and Telecom Italia in Italy to document the impact of a BT-rule (see Becht (2002) for the most rigorous casebased study). In this study we extent this handful of cases to a systematic analysis of almost all
European firms with dual class shares.
The intensity of the debate about some of the proposals in the report has implied that the BT-rule has been removed from the directive proposal that was put forward by the EU-commission in October 2002. We still believe the present analysis is important for at least two reasons: First, the Winter-report had little empirically analysis of the impact of its proposal. It is difficult to evaluate the welfare implications of a given policy proposal without identifying the actual number of affected firms which is the contribution of the present paper. Second, it is likely that there may be future proposals in the ongoing process of harmonizing corporate laws within the European Union directed at firms with dual class shares and a significant disproportionality between the distribution of control and residual income rights. The categorization system developed in this paper should be easy applicable to the analysis of such future initiatives.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: In the next section we briefly discuss our data set and the distribution of firms with dual class shares in Europe. Section 3 develops our categorization of the impact of a BT-rule using firms in Sweden as an example. Section 4 provides the main contribution of the paper, namely, the identification of firms affected by the BT-rule among all firms with dual class shares in Europe. Section 5 identifies the BT-rule's impact on firms' ability to raise capital through issuing new shares to outside investors. Finally, we discuss our findings in Section 6.
Data
We combine data from two sources. Most of our data origin from Faccio and Lang (2002) In addition to this data we have surveyed publicly traded companies in Denmark and Sweden listed on the stock exchanges in Copenhagen and Stockholm respectively. 4 We have collected the ultimate ownership distribution for 70 Danish and 185 Swedish firms, which are all firms with dual class shares in these countries. 5 For the record it should be noted that the data from Faccio and Lang (2002) are from 1996 to 1999 while the data from Denmark and Sweden are from 2001.
The available data on the ultimate owners fit our purpose well, since we are interested in the largest owner and the group of large owners in each firm. However we do not catch ultimate owners that have diluted their ownership stake into several holdings below the 5 percent disclosure level. 6 For these firms our analysis will slightly underestimate the effects of the break through rule. Further it should be noted that we might place some companies in the wrong category if there recently have been significant changes to their ownership structure.
Firms with dual class shares:
A necessary condition for any impact of a BT-rule on the control structure of a given firm is that there exists disproportionality between the distribution of cash flow and votes. Hence, firms organized according to a one-share-one-vote principle will not be affected. Table 1 shows the presence of dual class shares in 12 EU countries. 4 The Danish data were obtained from Greens, who publish a yearly survey of the 5,000 largest Danish companies, and the Swedish data origin from SIS Ägarservice, who publish a yearly book on quoted companies in Sweden.
5 Faccio and Lang (2002) also include Swedish firms, but are fewer in numbers. 6 In Italy and UK the disclosure levels are 2 and 3 pct. respectively. firms with dual class shares. Relative to the number of public traded firms, the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and Italy have most dual class shares firms.
A categorization system.
The presence of different voting classes is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a BT-rule to have any impact on the control structure of a firm. The real impact is determined by the disproportionality between the distribution of votes and the distribution of cash flow rights in a given firm. This disproportionality is by itself determined by the number of share classes, the relative difference in number of votes attached to each share class, the distribution of shares across owners within each class and the number of shares in each class.
We have collected all this information for all firms with dual class shares in Sweden. In the following we therefore use the subset of 185 Swedish firms with dual class shares to develop a categorization system for the impact of a BT-rule on the control structure of Swedish firms. In the next section we apply this system to the large sample of 1,035 European firms.
There are two benefits of using only Swedish firms to develop our categorization system: First, Swedish firms frequently use dual class shares, thus, we expect the BT-rule to have a significant Holmen AB, no. 453) has three times as many LVSs as SVSs, it will be located at 0.25 on the horizontal axis.
The vertical axis measures the amount of cash flow the largest owner possesses. We plot all 174 firms in the figure using the information on possession of the two share classes. In Table A .1 in the appendix we have listed all 1,035 firms with dual class shares and attached a number lexicographically on country and firm name. This is done to identify the effect of the BT-rule on firm level. We divide the firms according to if the largest owner has a majority of the votes or not.
In the former case the firm is plotted with a dot, in the latter with a square in Panel A of Figure 1 . The second line in Figure 1 The second group of firms is the "squares" above the BT-rule, i.e. firms in which the largest owner possesses more than 25 pct. of the cash flow but has less than 50 pct. of the votes. In most of these firms the largest owner will be the controlling owner or among the group of controlling owners and the BT-rule will have little impact. For this reason, we denote these firms as having comfort with indirect control. The confectionery producer Coletta Fazer AB belongs to this group, since the largest owner with 44.1 and 34.7 percent of the votes and cash flow enjoys comfort without direct control. In total, there are 24 firms in Sweden in this group.
The rest of the firms are situated below the BT-line in Figure 1 implying that potentially there can be some kind of control loss. The most direct control loss comes for the largest owner in the firms with dots in the triangle surrounded by the BT-line and the control line. These firms are characterized by a single owner with a majority of the votes but less than 25 pct. of the cash flow.
Before the introduction of the BT-rule, this single owner would have absolute control of the corporation. However, after an introduction it is in principle possible for an aggressive investor to 8 We have chosen a BT-rule of 75 pct. because this level is proposed in the Winter report. However, it is easy to repeat our analysis for any other threshold values.
9 When reporting the number of firms in each group we will include those Swedish firms, which could not be illustrated in the figure due to different voting structures, i.e. the total number of firms is then 185.
buy up all outstanding shares that are not in the hands of the controlling owner and apply the BTrule to take-over the corporation. We say that these firms are characterized by a direct control loss.
Two examples of Swedish firms that incur a direct control loss due to a 75 pct. BT-rule are Novotek AB and Trelleborg AB. It is worth emphasizing that the actual size of the BT-rule has a large impact on the number of firms in this group. As an example, the number of firms in this group for a 75 pct.
BT-rule is 10, whereas Figure 1 shows that lowering the BT threshold to 70 pct (i.e. raising the BTline in Figure 1 to 0.30) would increase this group by 12 new firms.
The final group of firms is the "squares" below the BT-line. These firms are characterized by the largest owner having less than a majority of the votes and less than 25 pct. of the cash flow. Even though we know less about the control distribution in these firms, it is clear from the figure that there is a potential control loss after the introduction of the BT-rule, hence, we define that these firms are characterized by potential control loss. Volvo AB, with a large owner controlling 9.9 percent of both votes and cash flows, and the bank SEB AB are prominent examples of Swedish firms in this group. We observe 99 firms in this group.
The group with a potential control loss consists of two kinds of firms: Firms with a dispersed ownership structure, similar to a dispersed one-share-one-vote ownership structure, and firms which have a significant disporportionality between cash flow and votes, in which the controlling owners exercise their control through implicit or explicit contracts with other owners. It is only the owners of the latter type of firms that are likely to incur a real control loss after the introduction of the BTrule. We return to this important issue in the following section.
The premise of Figure 1 , that the ownership of the largest owner is pivotal for analyzing the impact of the BT-rule, is indeed not satisfied in all corporations. In many firms control is allocated to a group of owners who are tied together by formal or informal agreements. Hence, it may be that the important factor is the amount of control obtained and the cash flow internalized by such a group.
This idea is captured in Panel B, where we picture the amount of cash flow internalized by the group of owners with more than 5 pct. of the votes in the corporations. We interpretate this group as the group of controlling owners, even though this may not always be the case. The main difficulty with this assumption is that such a group does not necessary have common preferences, indeed, some of the owners with significant voting power can be hostile to the group of controlling owners.
This bias our analysis below towards underestimating the number of firms exposed to the BT-rule, because such hostile owners can include their own cash flow stake in an attempt to achieve the 75 pct. threshold level. This bias highlights the importance of the dual analysis of the largest and the group of largest owners.
The main difference between Panel A and B in Figure 1 is that firms in the latter figure moves up parallel to the vertical axis if there are several owners with more than five percent of the votes.
Thus, more firms lie in the two comfort zones now and fewer firms are directly affected by the BT- there is still a significant number of firms for which the BT-rule will imply either a direct or an indirect loss of control. We count that 14 firms incur a direct control loss and 27 firms incur a potential control loss from the introduction of the rule. Thus 21 percent of the firms in Sweden with dual class shares will either face a direct or potential loss of control due to the BT-rule.
To sum up, we have established that between 10 and 14 Swedish firms face a direct control loss and between 27 and 99 face a potential control loss after the introduction of a BT-rule. This implies that between 22 and 59 percent of the Swedish firms with dual class shares (or between 12 and 33 pct.
of all public corporations) potentially may incur some control related effect of the BT-rule.
European firms affected by the BT-rule
The categorization system developed in the previous section can be extended to the whole sample of 1,035 European firms with multiple share classes. As mentioned above, a prerequisite for drawing Figure 1 was that the ratio of votes between SVSs and LVSs is constant for all firms in the figures. This is the case in all but 11 Swedish firms but not a general feature across Europe, implying that it is not possible to draw similar figures for all the firms in our sample.
However, we do have sufficient information about the distribution of cash flow and votes for all corporations in our sample to categorize each firm according to the four groups we developed in the previous section. This is done in Table A .2 in the appendix for all 1,035 firms based on the numbers assigned in Table A. 1. Figure 2 summarizes this information by illustrating the distribution of firms in each group divided into countries, the total sample and the largest firms measured on assets. The largest firms were drawn from a top-500 list of publicly traded European firms. Of these 500 firms 104 were in our sample of firms with dual class shares. In the appendix, we have marked these 104 large firms with bold in Table A .1 and we refer to them as the Top-500 firms in the following.
Panel A in Figure 2 shows the distribution of firms according to the largest owner's possession of votes and cash flow, whereas Panel B shows the same information for the group of controlling owners. Pirelli SPA. The BT-rule does not increase the likelihood of being taken over, since the largest owner has sufficient shares to block any attempt to invoke the BT-rule. It is worth mentioning that in principle these firms can still incur an indirectly cost, because the rule may limit the amount of cash flow they can sell or the firms' ability to raise capital by issuing new shares without affecting the existing control structure. We return to this issue in the following section.
Second, if we instead look at the group of large owners the share of firms that are in the two comfort zones increases to 52 pct. or 536 firms. Hence, slightly more than half of the firms will not incur a control related cost after the introduction of a BT-rule. As mentioned above, the absence of any direct cost of the BT-rule hinges on the assumption that all large owners wish to keep the current control structure. If instead, one of these owners with a significant cash flow stake supports a take-over initiative, the firm is not protected anymore. income and firms with strong disproportionality between control and cash flow where the largest owner (or largest owners) does not posses a majority of the votes. In the former case we do not expect a significant impact of the BT-rule since these firms are similar to firms with a single share class. In the latter type we expect that the largest owner (or the group of large owners) in reality controls the firm through formal or informal contracts. For such firms the BT-rule is likely to have a significant impact.
The distribution of firms among these two types will differ across countries. We expect that the dispersed ownership structure explanation is more prominent in the many UK firms than in the Continental European firms within this group. We can find some support for this argument, by looking at Figure 3 , which plots the largest owner's and group of large owners' possession of cashflow against their possession of votes, in panel A and B respectively, for all firms in the potential control loss group. In Continental European and Scandinavian countries like Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy and Sweden, we observe a scattered plot with many firms lying significantly above the 45-degree line. We have estimated the regression line for these scattered plots and added to the figure. Notice that proportionality between cash flow and votes imply a regression line close to the 45-degree line, whereas disproportionality implies a regression line above the 45-degree line.
Hence, we see that in Continental European and Scandinavian countries most of the firms with dual class shares have a strong disproportionality. 10 Thus, control is concentrated in these firms, supporting the argument that there is a real loss of control from a BT-rule, since it is likely that the group of large owners in reality has complete control over the corporation before the BT-rule.
The results are quite different for UK and Ireland. We notice from Figure We can apply the preceding arguments to separate out the firms in the potential control loss group whose owners are likely to incur a real loss of control. Figure 4 depicts the distribution of disproportionality across all firms with potential control loss. We measure the degree of disproportionality as the difference between the amount of votes and cash flow internalized by either the largest owner (Panel A) or the group of largest owners (Panel B). Thus, Figure 4 summarizes the more detailed information in Figure 3 . We define the group of firms whose owners are likely to incur a control loss as all firms in which the disproportionality measure is 10 pct. or higher. Notice that the relative size of this likely control loss group is significantly larger in Denmark, Germany, Italy and Sweden than in UK and Ireland, confirming the insight from Figure   3 . In Table A .2 in the Appendix we have specified which firms belong to this likely control loss group.
With these definitions we observe in Panel A, that in total 179 or 28 pct. of the firms in the potential control loss group are likely to actually face a real control loss after the introduction of the BT-rule.
Examples are Stora Enso, Fiat and Ericsson. On the other hand, large UK firms such as British Airways and Diago are not likely to incur a real loss even though these firms belong to the potential control loss group. The argument is that these firms have diluted control even before the introduction of the BT-rule and their organization is very similar to the organization of firms with a single share class.
It is interesting to notice that 27 out of the 63 larger firms in the potential control loss group are also in the likely control loss group. Thus the share of larger firms that are likely to face a real control loss within the potential control loss group is larger than the share of small and medium firms. This indicates that a significant number of the European top-500 firms will be affected by the rule. Figure 4 , Panel B provides the distribution of disproportionality among the potential control loss firms focusing on the group of largest owners. We notice that 119 or 26 pct. of the 456 firms in the potential control loss group are likely to actually realize this cost. Notice, the share of larger firms that are likely to face a real control loss within the potential control loss group is now almost the same as the share of small and medium firms. Figure 5 summarizes the main findings in the present paper. In this figure we depict We sum up this section by emphasizing our main findings: We believe that the owners of at least 3-5 pct. (or between 33 and 47) of the European firms with dual class shares will incur a direct loss of control after the introduction of a 75 pct. BT-rule. In addition, we find that the owners of additional 11-17 pct. (or between 119 and 179) of the firms are likely to incur a control loss. These firms are identified in the Appendix. Furthermore, the significance of the BT-rule differs across countries, with firms in Germany, Italy and the Scandinavian countries being most vulnerable. In addition a significant number of British firms with dual class shares are potentially affected, even though the more dispersed ownership structure in these firms may reduce the actual impact.
The impact on firms' ability to raise capital via the stock market.
It is unlikely that changing the regulative regime in which European corporations work will not affect the organization of these firms. Several commentators (e.g. Bebchuck and Hart 2002 , Berglof and Burkart 2002 , and Bolton 2002 have suggested that some firms affected by the BT-rule for instance can reorganize themselves using pyramidal structures to keep the current control distribution, and other firms may choose to incorporate in a country outside the European Union.
An alternative and less drastic response from the affected firms in the direct or potential control loss areas of Figure 1 and 2 above is that controlling shareholders buy up cash-flow until they reach the 25 percent threshold.
In addition to some owners buying up shares, the BT-rule is likely to restrict the willingness of corporations to raise capital by issuing new shares to investors outside the controlling group of owners. In particular, it is likely that the firms prefer other and more expensive sources of capital than using the stock market if the latter implies a change in control structure.
We analyze these two questions simultaneously in the following. We assume that the corporations can issue only non-voting shares. Allowing for sale of voting shares may affect the control structure too, however, this effect would happen independently of the BT-rule. This motivates our assumption of issuing non-voting shares only.
To illustrate our approach we return to We estimate the firms' ability to raise capital by issuing shares to outsiders without falling short of the 25 pct. threshold. It is measured in percentages of the current outstanding shares to capture the fact small firms often need a smaller amount of new capital. The specific formula we apply is CF/0.25 -1, where CF stands for the largest owner's (or group of largest owners') share of cash flow. Notice that this measure can be either positive or negative. A negative number implies that the largest owner(s) currently possesses less than 25 pct. of the cash flow and therefore must buy up shares to avoid the control loss induced by the BT-rule.
In Table A .3 in the appendix we group our sample of 1,035 European firms according to how much capital they can raise without being affected by the BT-rule. We have summarized this information in Figure 6 .
Panel A of Figure 6 shows the possible issue of non-voting shares without changing the present control structure, focusing on the largest owner. The results vary significantly across countries in the European Union. Countries like Austria, Germany and Italy have a large proportion of firms in the positive range, whereas UK and Ireland have most firms in the negative, which is consistent with these countries having many firms with a dispersed ownership structure.
Notice that in general there are few firms in the interval (-10,10) pct., which we define as the relevant range for most large owners with an intention of changing the capital structure of a given firm. This supports the conclusion that changing capital structure in response to the introduction of As emphasized above, many firms will be in the negative area due to a dispersed ownership structure. Figure 7 analyzes the impact on capital structure where we have removed all firms with a diproportionality less than 10 pct. for either the largest owner (Panel A) or the group of largest owners (Panel B). When we focus on the largest owner this leaves us with 230 firms. There are 32 of these which are located in the (-10; +10) pct. range. This is a realistic estimate on the number of firms that will choose not to issue shares to outsiders or whose controlling owner may try to buy up shares. This is a small number and it is sensitive to the method we have applied. If we instead include all firms with a disproportionality measure larger than 5 pct. it increases the number of firms in this range to 46. Panel B focuses on the group of large number. With a 10 pct.
disproportionality cutoff level we observe that 46 firms are located in the (-10; +10) pct. range.
Again this is a relative small number. If we instead use the 5 pct. cutoff level on the measure of disproportionality, the number of firms likely to be affected is 56.
From the present analysis we can conclude that a significant number of firms are likely to either use alternative and more expensive sources of capital or to buy up own shares to neutralize the effect of a BT-rule. There is one important caveat to this conclusion. We have identified firms, which either have an incentive to change capital structure if they are below the BT-rule's threshold value or can not issue shares if they are above this threshold. However, many old well-established firms do not use the stock market to raise capital. Thus, it is likely that some of the firms we have identified even in the absence of a BT-rule would use other channels to raise capital. This may imply that the real number of firms incurring a capital related cost from the BT-rule is smaller than we have found.
Discussion.
The BT-proposal has been controversial and raised much discussion among lawyers and economists. In the present paper, we have tried to qualify this debate by a systematic investigation of which European firms are likely to be affected by the BT-rule. The Winter-report argued that the introduction of the BT-rule in the European Union would level the playing-field and thereby extend the outside pressure on the corporations, which is supposed to generate an improved standard of corporate governance to the benefit of the European Community.
Even though the intensive debate following the Winter-report has implied that the BT-rule has been removed from the new directive proposal to the EU commission in October 2002, it is still important to understand the empirical consequences of introducing such an rule in Europe. Not least because it is likely that there may be future proposals in the ongoing harmonization process directed at firms with dual class shares and a significant disproportionality between the distribution of control and residual income rights.
We have shown that the controlling owners in 3-5 pct. or 33 to 47 of the 1,035 firms with dual class shares incur a direct loss of control due to the BT-rule. In addition to this direct control loss, we expect that the controlling owners in 11-17 pct of the corporations are likely to face a control related loss. These firms are in particular incorporated in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden and United Kingdom. Between 20 and 31 of these firms belong to the group of largest European firms. On the basis of these findings we draw our main conclusion; a significant number of the European firms with dual class shares are likely to be affected by the BT-rule.
It is important to emphasize that this does not in itself imply that the rule is good or bad for the European Community. Proponents may argue that the desired mobility of corporate control and the implied effects on corporate governance only will be achieved if there are a significant number of firms affected by the rule. If the common organization of the firms imply that the owners where in the comfort zones (to use the language of Figure 2 ), the proposal would be redundant, since it would have little real impact.
Similarly, opponents of the proposal may be serious concerned with the number of firms affected and the fact that many well-driven large European firms appears to be among the vulnerable corporations. It is likely, that these firms will reorganize themselves to avoid the impact of the BTrule. We have shown that buying up cash flow to neutralize the rule is realistic for only a few firms.
Hence, in an attempt to neutralize the BT-rule's impact, we can expect many other firms to reorganize the ownership structure through pyramidal schemes or to incorporate in countries outside the European Union. Of course all such activities are expected to be costly in addition to working against the intention behind the BT-rule.
An interesting question if the BT-rule in the future would be implemented in the European Union is if owners are entitled to compensation due to loss of control. This question has two dimensions:
First, if a loss of control legally entitles an owner to being compensated. We have little to say about this question which is likely to be determined by the European or the national courts. However, if a control loss should be compensated, there is a second dimension to this issue, which is to estimate the size of any individual owner's loss of control. The individual firm's actual or likely loss must be the basis for defining the size of a potential compensation. Our categorization system may be helpful in dealing with this question. For instance the largest owner in a firm characterized by comfort with direct control in Panel A in Figure 2 is significantly less affected than an owner in the direct control loss group is. In particular, our figures and appendices may explicit identify firms which incur no direct or likely control loss from the future introduction of a BT-rule and, thus, may have less strong claims for being entitled to compensation. The figure contains all Swedish firms with dual class shares where the voting ratio between SVS(Superior Voting Shares) and LVS (Limited Voting Shares) is 10 to 1. In total there are 173 firms in the figure, we have labelled the 50 largest firms with a number referring to the companies listed in Table A .1 in the appendix. For each firm we plot the SVS share of the total cash flow on the horizontal axis. The firms are divided into two groups; those with a controlling owner and those where the largest owner possess less than 50 percent of the votes. We mark these two groups with a dot and a quadrangle respectively and plot the cash flow of this particular owner on the vertical axis. Thus, each firm is only represented once in the figure. The Control Line gives the minimum cash flow necessary to control the firm. The Break-Through Line illustrates the minimum cash flow level that will prevent other owners from breaking through. Table A .1 in the appendix. For each firm we plot the SVS share of the total cash flow on the horizontal axis. We establish the group of owners by summing the cash flow åand control rights for those owners which hold more than 5 percent of the votes. The firms are divided into two groups; those where the group of large owners possesses a majority and those with a minority, where the group of large owners possesses less than 50 percent of the votes. We mark these two groups with a triangle and a diamond respectively and plot the cash flow of this particular group on the vertical axis. Thus, each firm is only represented once in the figure. The Control Line gives the minimum cash flow necessary to control the firm. The Break-Through Line illustrates the minimum cash flow level that will prevent other owners from breaking through. Note: The figures display the group of large owners' share of cash flow and votes for firms with a potential control loss in each country due to the Break-Through rule. The broken line illustrates proportionality between cash flow and votes, which is present in an one-share-one-vote structure. The degree of disproportionality can be measured by the geometric distance from the proportionality line. 
Panel B: Degree of Disproportionality in Firms with a Potential Control Loss, Group of Large Owners
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